



UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov

APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/594,684	09/28/2006	Hiroshi Kase	00005.001304.	2139
5514 7590 03/16/2010 FITZPATRICK CELLA HARPER & SCINTO 1290 Avenue of the Americas NEW YORK, NY 10104-3800				
EXAMINER				
MILLIGAN, ADAM C				
ART UNIT		PAPER NUMBER		
1612				
MAIL DATE		DELIVERY MODE		
03/16/2010		PAPER		

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

Office Action Summary

Application No.

10/594,684

Applicant(s)

KASE ET AL.

Examiner

ADAM MILLIGAN

Art Unit

1612

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --
Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) OR THIRTY (30) DAYS, WHICHEVER IS LONGER, FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

Status

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on 18 December 2009 and 5 January 2010.
- 2a) ☒ This action is **FINAL**. 2b) ☐ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

Disposition of Claims

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 15 and 21 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) _____ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 15 and 21 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) _____ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

Application Papers

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on _____ is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

- 12) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☐ All b) ☐ Some * c) ☐ None of:
1. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
 2. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. _____.
 3. ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

Attachment(s)

- 1) ☒ Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)
- 2) ☐ Notice of Draftperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)
- 3) ☒ Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO/SB-08)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date 10g (12/18/2009)
- 4) ☐ Interview Summary (PTO-413)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date _____
- 5) ☐ Notice of Informal Patent Application
- 6) ☐ Other: _____

DETAILED ACTION

Applicants' arguments, filed 12/18/2009 and 1/5/2010, have been fully considered. Rejections and/or objections not reiterated from previous office actions are hereby withdrawn. The following rejections and/or objections are either reiterated or newly applied. They constitute the complete set presently being applied to the instant application.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112 – Scope of Enablement

The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

Claim 15 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, because the specification, while being enabling for treating the symptom chronic musculoskeletal pain when present in diseases, does not reasonably provide enablement for treatment of the underlying diseases themselves. Note, as constructed the claims do not specify active steps for the treatment of pain per se, which the specification enables, but rather read on treatment of the underlying disease the pain "accompanies", which is not enabled. The specification does not enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to use the invention commensurate in scope with these claims.

To be enabling, the specification of the patent must teach those skilled in the art

how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without undue experimentation. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Explaining what is meant by “undue experimentation,” the Federal Circuit has stated:

The test is not merely quantitative, since a considerable amount of experimentation is permissible, if it is merely routine, or if the specification in question provides a reasonable amount of guidance with respect to the direction in which the experimentation should proceed to enable the determination of how to practice a desired embodiment of the claimed invention. PPG v. Guardian, 75 F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996).¹

The factors that may be considered in determining whether a disclosure would require undue experimentation are set forth by In re Wands, 8 USPQ2d 1400 (CAFC 1988) at 1404 where the court set forth the eight factors to consider when assessing if a disclosure would have required undue experimentation. Citing Ex parte Forman, 230 USPQ 546 (BdApls 1986) at 547 the court recited eight factors:

- 1) the quantity of experimentation necessary,
- 2) the amount of direction or guidance provided,
- 3) the presence or absence of working examples,
- 4) the nature of the invention,
- 5) the state of the prior art,
- 6) the relative skill of those in the art,
- 7) the predictability of the art, and
- 8) the breadth of the claims.

These factors are always applied against the background understanding that scope of enablement varies inversely with the degree of unpredictability involved. In re Fisher, 57 CCPA 1099, 1108, 427 F.2d 833, 839, 166 USPQ 18, 24 (1970). Keeping that in mind, the Wands factors are relevant to the instant fact situation for the following reasons:

1. The nature of the invention, state and predictability of the art, and relative skill level

The invention relates to the treatment of diseases, generally, which are accompanied by chronic musculoskeletal pain. Note, for instance, the difference between treating pain which is associated with cancer and treating cancer itself. The relative skill of those in the art is high, that of an MD or Ph.D. That factor is outweighed, however, by the unpredictable nature of the art. For example, where the underlying disease is cancer, the examiner cites Suggitt and Bibby, *Clinical Cancer Research*, Vol. 11, 971-981 as illustrative of the state of the art. Suggitt and Bibby teaches the unpredictability of treating cancer. Note however, that the current human tumor cell line in vitro screen is generally unpredictable. Modern methods are susceptible to false-positive and false-negative results. (page 973 1st paragraph on right-hand column). Difficulty in determining results leads to difficulty in testing for effectiveness of compounds, which leads to unpredictability in treating cancers.

2. The breadth of the claims

The claims are broad insofar as they disclose treating diseases per se, where the patient population would also have chronic musculoskeletal pain either due to the disease to be treated or another unrelated disease, as discussed above.

¹ As pointed out by the court in In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498 at 504 (CCPA 1976), the key word is “undue”, not “experimentation”.

3. The amount of direction or guidance provided and the presence or absence of working examples

The specification provides no direction or guidance for practicing the claimed invention in its "full scope". No reasonably specific guidance is provided concerning useful therapeutic protocols for treatment of diseases generally, other than the treatment of chronic musculoskeletal pain. The latter is corroborated by the working examples.

4. The quantity of experimentation necessary

Because of the known unpredictability of the art, and in the absence of experimental evidence, no one skilled in the art would accept the assertion that the instantly claimed agents could be predictably used to treat diseases generally, as inferred by the claim and contemplated by the specification. Accordingly, the instant claims do not comply with the enablement requirement of §112, since to practice the claimed invention in its "full scope" a person of ordinary skill in the art would have to engage in undue experimentation, with no assurance of success.

Examiner suggests amending the claims to recite "A method of treating the chronic musculoskeletal pain comprising ..." in order to obviate this ground of rejection.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103

The text of those sections of Title 35, U.S. Code not included in this action can be found in a prior Office action.

Claims 15 and 21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Suzuki (U.S. 5,587,378) in view of Ledent (Aggressiveness, hypoalgesia and high blood pressure in mice lacking the adenosine A_{2a} receptor, Nature, Vol. 388, pp 674-678, August 1997 – See IDS dated 1/31/2007).

Applicants argue that the combination of Suzuki and Ledent is insufficient to render the instant claims obvious because Ledent teaches only that A_{2a} receptor is a target for drug design and antagonists have been “considered” as treatments for Parkinson's disease, stroke, pain and inflammatory disorders, but Ledent provides no evidence that A_{2a} receptor antagonists are in fact useful for treating pain.

Secondly, Applicants assert there is no motivation to select the specific adenosine A_{2a} receptor antagonist from the general list.

Examiner disagrees. While Ledent provides no specific data on using A_{2a} receptor antagonists to treat pain, Ledent does in fact suggest using A_{2a} receptor antagonists for treating pain (p.677, Left Col., Last ¶). Ledent also teaches that mice lacking A_{2a} receptors experience hypoalgesia (Title) based on the fact that mice lacking the A_{2a} receptor (knockout mice) showed slower responses to pain induced by a hot plate or a tail flick (p. 676, 1st ¶).

With regard to Applicants second argument, when addressing an issue of obviousness, the Supreme Court noted that the analysis under 35 USC 103 “need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR v. Teleflex, 127 S.Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007). The Court emphasized that “[a] person of ordinary skill is... a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” Id. at 1742. Here, a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that blocking a receptor by administration of an antagonist would provide the same response receptor were not present at all, only the response from blocking the receptor would be temporary. Since Ledent demonstrated that the A_{2a} receptor is responsible for pain sensation, it would have been obvious to the skilled artisan to administer a known A_{2a} receptor blocking compound, such as those taught by the primary reference. Based on the teachings of the secondary reference, the skilled artisan would have a reasonable expectation that administration of an A_{2a} receptor blocking compound would reduce pain sensitivity.

With regard to new claim 21, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to administer the compounds of the primary reference in order to treat pain given that the primary reference teaches the compounds block A_{2a} receptors and the secondary reference suggests that A_{2a} receptors are responsible for pain sensitivity. Further, it would have been obvious to treat diseases associated with pain, such as

hyperalgesia², using an A_{2a} receptor blocking compound, such as those disclosed in the primary reference.

Nonstatutory Double Patenting

The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the "right to exclude" granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., *In re Berg*, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); *In re Goodman*, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); *In re Longi*, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); *In re Van Ornum*, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); *In re Vogel*, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); and *In re Thorington*, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).

A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on a nonstatutory double patenting ground provided the conflicting application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with this application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement.

Effective January 1, 1994, a registered attorney or agent of record may sign a terminal disclaimer. A terminal disclaimer signed by the assignee must fully comply with 37 CFR 3.73(b).

Claims 15 and 21 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-10 of U.S. Patent No. 5,587,378 in view of Ledent (Aggressiveness, hypoalgesia and high blood pressure in mice lacking the adenosine A_{2a} receptor, *Nature*, Vol. 388, pp 674-678, August 1997 – See IDS dated 1/31/2007).

² Stedman's Medical Dictionary 27th Edition defines hyperalgesia as "extreme sensitivity to painful stimuli."

This rejection is maintained since allowable subject matter has not been indicated, nor has applicant filed a Terminal Disclaimer.

With regard to claim 21, as discussed above, it would have been obvious to treat a specific disease associated with pain with the compounds of the '378 patent, given that the secondary reference suggests that A_{2a} receptors are responsible for pain sensitivity.

Conclusion

No claims allowed.

Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, **THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL**. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).

A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire **THREE MONTHS** from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within **TWO MONTHS** of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the **THREE-MONTH** shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than **SIX MONTHS** from the date of this final action.

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to ADAM MILLIGAN whose telephone number is (571)270-7674. The examiner can normally be reached on M-F 9:00-5:00 EST.

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Fred Krass can be reached on (571)272-0580. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.

Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see <http://pair-direct.uspto.gov>. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.

/Frederick Krass/
Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 1612

/A. M./
Examiner, Art Unit 1612